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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional rights protecting individual liberty have
been subject to cycles of expansion and contraction, at both the
federal and state levels. As the Warren era gave way to those
of Burger and Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court
retreated from its broad definitions of constitutional criminal
procedural rights. Reacting to that trend, in 1977 United
States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan called for
state courts to protect individual constitutional rights under
their state constitutions, an approach known as the new
judicial federalism. 1 That coincided with a series of rulings by
the California Supreme Court preserving or expanding
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state
constitution. 2
Indeed, the California high court had been active in this
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502–03 (1977). See also William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: the Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 546–48, 550 (1986).
See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120–21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. For example, Justice Brennan pointed approvingly to the California
Supreme Court’s express rejection in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113–15
(1976) of the federal doctrine of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), that
statements taken outside of Miranda could nonetheless be used for impeachment.
See Brennan, supra note 1, at 498–500 (1977). The significance of Harris and
Disbrow is discussed infra Part III(C).
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area long before Justice Brennan’s call to action. Historically,
California was a progressive leader in developing individual
rights under its state constitution. 3 In particular, the state
high court was at the forefront in developing state
constitutional criminal procedure. 4 In 1955, the California
Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to evidence
illegally obtained by the government in People v. Cahan, six
years before the United States Supreme Court applied the
federal search and seizure exclusionary rule against the states
in Mapp v. Ohio. 5 The search and seizure exclusionary rule
under the California Constitution provided the defendant more
protection than the federal analogue because, unlike the
federal rule which covered only the illegal search of the
defendant, the California rule allowed a defendant to seek to
exclude evidence based on the illegal search of a third party,
the so-called “vicarious exclusionary rule.” 6 In other cases, the
California Supreme Court also expanded the protections
against warrantless searches in ways beyond what the federal
constitution required. 7
In 1978, the California Supreme Court in People v. Wheeler
prohibited the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of
race. 8 That was eight years before the United States Supreme
Court’s federal constitutional decision on that issue in Batson
v. Kentucky. 9 In 1965, the California Supreme Court required
the exclusion of the incriminating extrajudicial statements of
a codefendant in People v. Aranda. 10 The similar federal
constitutional decision by the United States Supreme Court

3. David A. Carrillo, The California Judiciary, in GOVERNING
CALIFORNIA: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE
GOLDEN STATE, 299, 301–02 (Ethan Rarick, ed., 2013). A notable civil rights
case extending greater free speech rights under the state constitution than that
required by the federal First Amendment is Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr.,
23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979).
4. See Kevin M. Mulcahy, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the
Most Progressive State Supreme Court And What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 863, 884–887 (2000).
5. People v. Cahan 44 Cal.2d 434, 442, 451 (1955); Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S.
643, 651, 655 (1961).
6. People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 759–60 (1955).
7. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548–52 (1975); People v. Norman,
14 Cal. 3d 929, 939 (1975).
8. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276–77 (1978).
9. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
10. People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 530–31 (1965).
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followed three years later in Bruton v. United States. 11
Finally, the California Supreme Court defined a greater
scope for the exclusion of confessions under its state
constitution than the United States Supreme Court did under
the federal constitution. In 1976, the California Supreme
Court held in People v. Disbrow that confessions taken outside
of Miranda could not be used for any purpose. 12 In contrast,
the United States Supreme Court had held in 1971 in Harris
v. New York that statements taken outside of Miranda, while
excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, could be used to
impeach a defendant who took the stand. 13 The California
Supreme Court also expanded Miranda protections in other
cases beyond that required by the federal constitution. 14
The main proponent for the new judicial federalism on the
California Supreme Court was Justice Stanley Mosk. 15 As
authority, he pointed to Article I, Section 24 of the California
Constitution, which had been adopted by the voters in
November 1974. This new section declared that the “rights
guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.” 16 Although
Justice Mosk acknowledged that Article I, Section 24 had been
presented to the voters “as a mere reaffirmation of existing
law,” he also regarded it as confirming the independent state
ground theory of constitutional rights. 17 The years between
the adoption of Article, I Section 24 in November 1974 and the
passage of Proposition 8 in June 1982 were the high-water
mark for independent state ground decisions in the area of
constitutional criminal procedure by the California Supreme
Court. 18
11. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
12. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113 (1976). See infra Part III(C).
13. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). See infra Part III(C).
14. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 609–610 (1986); People v. Pettingill,
21 Cal. 3d 231, 247–48 (1978); People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 604, 608 (1978).
15. See Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1088–91 (1985); Stanley Mosk, California
constitutional Symposium: Introduction, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 10–11
(1989).
16. Proposition 7 was a legislatively–referred constitutional amendment,
approved in the November 5, 1974 statewide election, which (among other
changes) added the referenced text as part of a new Section 24 to Article I; People
v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551 (1975).
17. Id. at 551.
18. As discussed infra in Part III, it is to the decisions in these years that the
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As with the United States Supreme Court, the expansive
trend in the California high court in turn saw its own
contraction. The California Supreme Court’s self-conscious
reliance on state constitutional grounds to grant more
protections to criminal defendants than that required by
United States Supreme Court decisions drew opposition from
the state’s prosecutors and victims’ rights groups. 19 In 1983,
one appellate court noted that the debate over the “use of the
doctrine of independent state grounds to avoid the impact” of
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in the Fourth
Amendment context had “increased to a fever pitch in recent
years.” 20 Another appellate opinion in 1974 prophetically
observed: “A sudden switch to a California ground to avoid the
impact of federal high court decisions invites the successful use
of the initiative process to overrule the California decision with
its concomitant harm to the prestige, influence, and function of
the judicial branch of state government.” 21
That is precisely what happened. In recent years,
California has become known for removing individual rights
from its constitution by initiative. Because of these initiatives,
California is now unique for providing no state constitutional
protection to its citizens, beyond that required by the federal
constitution, in the majority of the areas of constitutional
This trend began in 1982 with
criminal procedure. 22
Proposition 8, which eventually resulted in the practical
elimination of independent state grounds as a basis for
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine in California. 23 The
most recent example is the ban on same-sex marriage enacted
by another Proposition 8 in 2008, which the California
Supreme Court upheld against a constitutional challenge in

California Supreme Court looked to in Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336
(1990), in reasserting the independent authority of the state constitution to
protect individual rights against Proposition 115.
19. See e.g., the criticism of John Van de Kamp, then District Attorney of Los
Angeles in John K. Van de Kamp and Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the
Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California
Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 1109, 1110–11 (1982).
20. In the Matter of Lance W., 197 Cal.Rptr. 331, 335 (1983) (depublished by
In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985)).
21. Id. at 335 (citing People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 941 (1975) (citing
People v. Norman, previously published at 36 Cal.App. 3d 879 (1974))).
22. See discussion infra Part IV(A).
23. See discussion infra Part II.
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Strauss v. Horton. 24
This Article examines the jurisprudential issues raised by
the removal of individual rights from the California
Constitution, specifically criminal procedural rights. As we
describe below, the precedent for the removal of the state equal
protection right to same-sex marriage in Strauss was a series
of cases in the 1980s and 1990s. Those cases curtailed state
criminal procedural rights based on a series of initiatives, the
most significant of which was the so-called Truth-in-Evidence
provision enacted in 1982 by Proposition 8. 25 The Truth-inEvidence provision was initially regarded as confining only the
scope of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure violations
to no more than the federal rule. 26 But over time, judicial
decisions erroneously expanded the Truth-in-Evidence
provision to include virtually every aspect of criminal
procedure under the state constitution. 27 The end result has
been the effective limitation of state constitutional criminal
procedural rights by judicial interpretation to amount to no
more than that allowed by the federal constitution.
It should be cause for concern that, despite its original
limitation to remedies, the 1982 Proposition 8 has been held by
later judicial interpretation to abolish individual rights. 28
Surely the power to create or remove constitutional rights
must, at the outset, lie outside the judicial branch, just as the
power to interpret those rights once established must belong to
the judiciary; these principles are elemental in California’s
system of divided government. 29 Yet until the decision in
Strauss v. Horton, the California Supreme Court had never
expressly acknowledged that even the initiative power could
remove individual rights from the state constitution. 30 Before
24. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 385–86, 391 (2009). See discussion
infra Part I.
25. See discussion infra Part III(A).
26. See discussion infra Part III(B).
27. See discussion infra Part III(C–D).
28. See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 450.
29. David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law:
Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 670–73 (2011).
30. True, the opinion in In re Lance W. did observe in dicta that “[t]he people
could by amendment of the Constitution repeal Section 13 of Article I in its
entirety.” 37 Cal. 3d 873, 892 (1985). But that was not part of the holding in that
decision, so that issue remained an open question until Strauss.
An earlier case, People v. Frierson, 25 Cal.3d 142 (1979), had upheld a ballot
initiative that had the effect of removing a defendant’s previously-judicially-
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Strauss, the changes to state criminal procedural rights
brought about by the 1982 Proposition 8 were discussed by the
court in terms of a limitation of remedies, rather than the
removal of rights. 31 But the state constitutional ban on samesex marriage effected by Proposition 8 in 2008 squarely
presented the question of whether an initiative constitutional
amendment could eliminate individual rights. 32 Of course,
since Strauss was decided, the issue of same-sex marriage
proceeded to a resolution by the United States Supreme
Court. 33 Because of this, Strauss has receded from view, and
little thought has been given to its broader implications now
that its main holding has been superseded. 34
The Strauss decision, however, remains important on the
larger issue of removing rights under the state constitution,
including the restrictions effected by the 1982 Proposition 8.
Those restrictions are particularly problematic because in
1990 (eight years after Proposition 8 was enacted), in Raven v.
Deukmejian, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the

recognized right under the state constitution not to be subject to the death
penalty. See infra note 74. Frierson, however, did not analyze the issue of the
death penalty under the state constitution in terms of the removal of an
individual constitutional right. Rather, Frierson addressed the issue in terms of
a separation of powers analysis similar to the one the court would later use in
Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336 (1990). See discussion infra Part IV(B).
31. See infra Part II(B, C).
32. The official title and summary of Proposition 8 in 2008 described the
measure thus: “ELIMINATES RIGHT OF SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY.
INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Changes the California
Constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry in California.”
The analysis by the Legislative Analyst provided additional detail:
As a result of [a court ruling], marriage between individuals of the same
sex is currently valid or recognized in the state. [¶] PROPOSAL [¶] This
measure amends the California Constitution to specify that only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California. As a result, notwithstanding the California Supreme Court
ruling of May 2008, marriage would be limited to individuals of the
opposite sex, and individuals of the same sex would not have the right to
marry in California.
33. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (the federal
constitution “does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on
the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex”).
34. David B. Cruz, Equality’s Centrality: Proposition 8 and the California
Constitution, 19 REV. OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 45 (2010) presents a good
interrogation of the Strauss majority opinion based on the importance of equal
protection to the state constitution. However, there is no discussion of the
precedential role that the removal of criminal procedural rights played in
Strauss.
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principle that the California Constitution should have an
independent role in protecting individual rights, distinct from
the protections provided by the federal constitution. 35 Raven
dealt with Proposition 115, which limited all state
constitutional criminal procedural rights to being no greater
than the corresponding rights under the federal constitution. 36
Raven invalidated this part of Proposition 115 as an
unconstitutional revision that fundamentally limited the role
of the state courts in interpreting and enforcing state
constitutional protections. 37 Nonetheless, by the time Raven
was decided, decisions applying the Truth-in-Evidence
provision had expanded it to the point that it was virtually as
far-reaching as the constitutional amendment of Proposition
115 that the state Supreme Court invalidated in Raven. 38
Thus, paradoxically, Raven held that the electorate’s power of
constitutional amendment could not achieve through
Proposition 115 what judicial interpretation of Proposition 8
had already done: reduce criminal procedural rights under the
state constitution to no more than the level required by the
federal constitution.
This Article analyzes the conflict in California’s
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine and proposes that
the solution is to contract the current broad reach of the Truthin-Evidence provision. The argument here is not that the
electorate exceeded its power in enacting the 1982 Proposition
8 in the first place—we acknowledge that the current state of
the law following Strauss is that initiatives can adjust or
remove individual rights under the state constitution. Instead,
this Article examines the judicial interpretation and
application of the 1982 Proposition 8, and concludes that the
measure has been unduly expanded beyond its proper scope by
erroneous judicial interpretation. Thus, following Strauss, the
question is no longer whether an initiative can remove
constitutional rights (it can)—instead, the question is whether
in the 1982 Proposition 8 the electorate intended only to
eliminate a remedy, or to eliminate the right itself. We argue
that (unlike the initiative in 2008) the 1982 Proposition 8 was

35.
36.
37.
38.

Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 353–55 (1990).
Id. at 342. See discussion infra Part IV(B).
Id. at 354–55. See discussion infra Part IV(B).
See discussion infra Part IV(A).
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not intended to abolish a right. We show, through an analysis
of the line of cases discussed here, how Proposition 8 was
erroneously interpreted to achieve a result that Raven
prohibits.
In particular, our analysis calls into doubt People v. May 39,
the case that opened the door to over-expanding the Truth-inEvidence provision. 40 May extended the Truth-in-Evidence
provision to apply to the state constitutional right against selfincrimination under Article I, Section 15, on the faulty
rationale that the exclusion of evidence under the right against
self-incrimination is doctrinally equivalent to the exclusion of
evidence under the right against illegal searches and
seizures. 41 May treated exclusion under both rights as
doctrinally-equivalent exclusionary rules, which pertained to
remedies rather than rights. 42 The May court therefore took a
right/remedy distinction specific to the jurisprudence of the
search and seizure exclusionary rule, and improperly imported
it into the area of the right against self-incrimination. By
conflating this right/remedy distinction, the May court avoided
acknowledging that it was removing part of the state right
against self-incrimination by so extending the Truth-inEvidence provision. 43
May was a controversial decision when it was decided, and
its flaws have become even more apparent after the decisions
in Raven and Strauss. Although Strauss acknowledges that
rights previously granted under the California Constitution
can be removed by initiative, Strauss also stresses that such a
removal of rights should be narrowly construed. 44 As a result,
we conclude that the scope of the Truth-in-Evidence provision
for California’s constitutional criminal procedural rights

39. 44 Cal. 3d 309 (1988).
40. See discussion infra Part III(C).
41. When this Article refers generally to the constitutional right against selfincrimination we will be referring to the core features of this right as reflected in
both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I,
Section 15 of the California Constitution. Likewise, when this Article refers
generally to the constitutional right against illegal searches and seizures, we will
be referring to the core features of this right as reflected in both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I, Section 13 of the
California Constitution. See discussion infra, Part III(B)(2).
42. See discussion infra Part III(C).
43. See discussion infra Part III(C).
44. See discussion infra Part I (discussing Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 446).

KAISER FINAL

42

1/4/2016 9:52 AM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

should be limited to the area of exclusion under the search and
seizure exclusionary rule for two reasons: because the doctrinal
rationale for the current rule is unsound, and because it
conflicts with Strauss and Raven.
I.

REMOVING RIGHTS FROM THE STATE CONSTITUTION
BY INITIATIVE: STRAUSS V. HORTON

The California electorate can amend the state constitution
with relative ease through the initiative process. 45 This creates
the potential for initiatives to reduce or eliminate state
constitutional rights. 46 But part of the traditional conception
of a constitution is that it establishes a set of basic and
inviolable rights. 47 Thus, the very idea of reducing or
eliminating individual rights poses problems for constitutional
jurisprudence. Although advocates of living constitutionalism
are more open to the idea of constitutional change than are
originalists, they have traditionally viewed the process of
constitutional change as the continual expansion of rights,
without considering whether their theory might also permit
reductions in rights. 48 Under California law, what restrains
the initiative process from making the state constitution a
completely malleable entity is the doctrine that “although the
initiative process may be used to propose and adopt
45. “[T]he California constitution provides that an amendment to that
Constitution may be proposed either by two-thirds of the membership of each
house of the Legislature (Cal. Const., art. XVIII, § 1) or by an initiative petition
signed by voters numbering at least 8 percent of the total votes cast for all
candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election (Cal. Const., art. II, §
8, subd. (b); Id., art. XVIII, § 3), and further specifies that, once an amendment is
proposed by either means, the amendment becomes part of the state Constitution
if it is approved by a simple majority of the voters who cast votes on the measure
at a statewide election (id. art. XVIII, § 4.)” Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 386 (emphasis
omitted).
46. For a review of other states’ initiative processes see Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th,
at 391, 454–56. 17 states’ constitutions in addition to California’s permit
constitutional amendments to be proposed through the initiative process. Id. at
455. Of these, two states, Massachusetts and Mississippi, expressly prohibit the
modification of the state Bill of Rights through the initiative process. Id. at 389–
90, 455.
47. Justice Scalia, a leading proponent of originalism, expresses this view
that a constitution’s “whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights
in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 40 (1997).
48. David Aram Kaiser, Putting Progress Back Into Progressive: Reclaiming
A Philosophy Of History For The Constitution, 6 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 257 (2014).
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amendments to the California Constitution . . . that process
may not be used to revise the state constitution.” 49 In Strauss
v. Horton, the California Supreme Court considered the issue
of what changes would be major enough to constitute a
revision, rather than a mere amendment, to the state
constitution. 50 In 2008, the year before Strauss was decided,
the California Supreme Court decided In re Marriage Cases—
which examined the constitutional validity of the state
marriage statutes limiting marriage to a union between a man
and a woman—and held that the then-existing marriage
statutes infringed on the privacy, due process, and equal
protection rights of same-sex couples under the California
Constitution. 51 Thus, at the time Strauss was decided, samesex couples held state constitutional privacy, due process, and
equal protection rights. 52
At issue in Strauss was the constitutionality of the
Marriage Protection Act, which was approved by the voters as
Proposition 8 at the November 4, 2008 election, adding Section
7.5 to Article I of the California Constitution: “Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California,” 53 and which banned same-sex marriage under the
state constitution. If Proposition 8 was valid, its immediate
effect would be to nullify the court’s decision in In re Marriage
Cases and to reduce or eliminate the state constitutional
privacy, due process, and equal protection rights then held by
same-sex couples. As discussed below, the court examined the
question of whether changes to individual rights through a
ballot initiative necessarily constituted a revision to the state
constitution.
The Strauss decision ultimately upheld
Proposition 8 as a proper exercise of the initiative power. 54
The main argument by those opposing the Marriage
Protection Act was that it should be viewed as a constitutional
revision (which could not be done through the initiative
process), rather than a constitutional amendment (which
49. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 386.
50. Id. at 385. The court had confronted this issue several times before it
arose in Strauss. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208 (1978) and Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d.
336 (1990).
51. Id. at 384 (citing In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008)).
52. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 385–88.
53. Id. at 385.
54. Id. at 388.
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could). 55 As a result, the main analysis in Strauss examined
the distinction between revisions and amendments to the state
constitution. There were two questions: (1) whether the
Marriage Protection Act was a revision because it altered the
basic governmental plan or framework of the state, and (2)
whether it was a revision because it stripped fundamental
constitutional rights from individuals. 56 The court concluded
that the Marriage Protection Act was not a revision under
either approach. 57
As relevant here, on the question of whether the Marriage
Protection Act was a revision because it removed constitutional
rights from individuals, Strauss affirmed that “the scope and
substance of an existing state constitutional individual right,
as interpreted by this court, may be modified and diminished
by a change in the state Constitution itself, effectuated
through a constitutional amendment approved by a majority of
the electors acting pursuant to the initiative power.” 58
Although Strauss acknowledged that an initiative could be
used to reduce state constitutional rights, it left open the
question of whether a revision would result when an initiative
measure “actually deprives a minority group of the entire
protection of a fundamental constitutional right or, even more
sweepingly, leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private
discrimination in all areas without legal recourse.” 59 But the
Strauss majority opined that the Marriage Protection Act did
not present this issue because it was a “narrowly drawn
exception to a generally applicable constitutional principle” of
equal protection, which did not “amount to a constitutional
revision within the meaning of Article XVIII of the California
Constitution.” 60

55. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 386.
56. Id. at 388, 445.
57. See id. at 441–42, 444. On the question of whether the Marriage
Protection act was a revision because it altered the basic governmental plan or
framework of the state, the Strauss majority concluded that the Marriage
Protection Act worked no such change in the government’s fundamental structure
or the foundational powers of its branches. See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 441–42
(Marriage Protection Act “simply change[d] the substantive content of a state
constitutional rule in one specific subject area—the rule relating to access to the
designation of ‘marriage’ ” ).
58. See Id. at 450 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 446.
60. Id.
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This part of the analysis in Strauss has potentially farreaching implications. 61 Strauss described two increasingly
severe scenarios of the removal of rights through a
constitutional amendment: (1) one that deprives a minority
group of the entire protection of a fundamental constitutional
right, or (2) one that leaves such a group vulnerable to public
or private discrimination in all areas without legal recourse. 62
The specific application of the first scenario to the issue of
same-sex marriage is not entirely clear. 63 But the second, even
more dire, scenario of the outer limit of the initiative process is
given a citation to Romer v. Evans. 64 In Romer, the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional, on federal equal
protection grounds, an amendment to the Colorado
constitution that repealed and prohibited state laws barring
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 65 The high court
described “[t]he resulting disqualification of a class of persons
[namely, gays and lesbians] from the right to seek specific
protection from the law” as “unprecedented in our
jurisprudence.” 66 While Strauss cited Romer as defining the
outer limit beyond which no constitutional amendment could
go, the California Supreme Court did not explain how far an
initiative could go in removing rights before it ceased to be a
permissible “narrowly drawn exception.” 67
61. David A. Carrillo and Stephen M. Duvernay, California Constitutional
Law: The Guarantee Clause and California’s Republican Form of Government 62
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 104, 121 n.57 (2014) (“There is a potential problem with this
part of Strauss. What is the doctrinal basis for saying that a partial denial of a
right does not qualify as a revision, but a complete denial would? This reservation
potentially sets up a difficult future dispute over just how much a right needs to
be restricted to constitute a revision, or which rights would trigger this sort of
scrutiny.”)
62. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th, at 446.
63. An application of the first scenario to the issue of same-sex marriage
suggests the following interpretation, although a full analysis of this issue falls
outside the scope of this Article. Strauss had analyzed the deprivation of rights
under Proposition 8 only in terms of the removal of the name “marriage,” since
all the material benefits of marriage were independently available through the
domestic partnership act. By that logic, in a situation in which the material
benefits of marriage were not independently available, Proposition 8’s ban on
same-sex marriage under the state constitution would also impact the material
benefits and thus actually deprive same-sex couples of the entire protection of the
right to marriage, not just the name.
64. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
65. See id. at 626–27, 635–36.
66. Id. at 633.
67. See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 446.
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That question is troubling in the context of the Truth-inEvidence provision, which has, by judicial interpretation,
removed all or nearly all formerly-recognized state
constitutional criminal procedural rights. Specifically, in the
language of Strauss: is the Truth-in-Evidence provision, either
in its original form or its subsequent judicially-expanded scope,
a revision because it “actually deprives a minority group of the
entire protection of a fundamental constitutional right” or
because it “leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private
discrimination in all areas without legal recourse”? 68 Under
the analysis that follows, we conclude that, in its apparent
original scope, the Truth-in-Evidence provision is a
permissible limitation under Strauss because only the remedy
was affected rather than the underlying right. But, in its
present incarnation, the Truth-in-Evidence provision has
become impermissible because, under it, essentially all
criminal procedural rights under the state constitution have
been lockstepped to the federal constitution—a result that
Raven would prohibit. 69 So it must be that either the original
initiative was invalid in its scope, or it was made invalid by
later judicial interpretation that expanded the measure
beyond its proper reach. We conclude that the fault with the
Truth-in-Evidence provision in its present form lies in the
judicial interpretation of the measure, which has extended its
scope beyond what an initiative can accomplish and into an
impermissible deprivation of a minority group’s “entire
protection of a fundamental constitutional right.” 70
Applying the general Strauss principle of a revision limit
on changing state constitutional rights to the specific category
of constitutional criminal procedural rights raises three main
questions. First, are criminal procedural rights in the same
category as the equal protection rights at issue in Strauss?
Strauss says they are. 71 Indeed, Strauss specifically refers to
68. Id.
69. See Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354–55. See infra Part IV(B).
70. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 446.
71. See id. at 389 (“There are many other constitutional rights that have been
amended in the past through the initiative process, however, that also are
embodied in the state Constitution’s Declaration of Rights and reflect equally
long-standing and fundamental constitutional principles whose purpose is to
protect often unpopular individuals and groups from overzealous or abusive
treatment that at times may be condoned by a transient majority.”); see also id.
at 450 (“Under the California Constitution, the constitutional guarantees
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Proposition 115 and the first Proposition 8 as being relevant to
whether individual rights under the state constitution could be
removed or reduced:
As we have seen, in past years a majority of voters have
adopted several state constitutional amendments—for
example, the measure reinstating the death penalty, and
the multitude of constitutional changes contained in the
1982 Proposition 8 and in Proposition 115—that have
diminished state constitutional rights of criminal
defendants, as those rights had been interpreted in prior
decisions of this court. 72

Second, has the Truth-in-Evidence provision been
expanded beyond its intent? The text of the 1982 Proposition
8 does not require it to be interpreted as a Romer-level
reduction of rights and thus as an invalid revision. 73 Nor do
some of the key California Supreme Court decisions. In finding
Proposition 8’s restriction on same-sex marriage permissible
because it was “discrete” and “isolated,” Strauss refers to the
key early Truth-in-Evidence case, In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d
873, 891 (1985). 74 In so doing, Strauss echoes the court’s
similar characterization in Raven, which also discussed the
Truth-in-Evidence provision. 75 The Raven court described the

afforded to individuals accused of criminal conduct are no less well established or
fundamental than the constitutional rights of privacy and due process or the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.”).
72. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 450. In contrast, Justice Moreno, who dissented
in Strauss, did not want to acknowledge that there had been such a precedent for
the diminishing of individual rights under the state constitution through the
initiative process. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 492 (Moreno, J., dissenting). Thus he
argued that, “[e]ven in the area of criminal law and procedure, in which the
initiative process has perhaps made its boldest forays into the field of
constitutional rights, this court has stopped short of approving the kind of basic
constitutional change at issue in the present case.” Id.
73. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
74. See Strauss, 446 Cal. 4th at 444 (referring to “the discrete restrictions on
state constitutional protections that had been found not to constitute
constitutional revisions” in In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 891 (1985) and People
v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142 (1979)); see also id. at 437 (discussing the “isolated
provisions” at issue in Frierson and In re Lance W.). People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d
142, 184–87 (1979), upheld the constitutionality of a ballot initiative adding
Article I, Section 27 of the California Constitution, which states that the death
penalty “shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishments within the meaning” of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the state constitution (formerly Article I, Section 6, now Article I,
Section 17).
75. See Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 346, 355.
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holding of In re Lance W. in the following terms: “[W]e upheld
a provision limiting the state exclusionary remedy for search
and seizure violations to the boundaries fixed by the Fourth
Amendment to the federal Constitution.” 76 So described, the
Truth-in-Evidence provision is the kind of “discrete” and
“isolated” restriction of constitutional criminal procedural
rights that Raven and Strauss would permit. But as discussed
below, the later judicial expansion of the Truth-in-Evidence
provision brings its effect into the realm of an impermissible
deprivation of the entire protection of a fundamental
constitutional right. 77
If we accept the above-described characterizations of the
measure in Strauss, Raven, and In re Lance W., then the Truthin-Evidence provision should be read to affect only judiciallycreated remedies, but not the underlying constitutional rights,
nor to impermissibly remove the entire protection of a
fundamental constitutional right. But the Truth-in-Evidence
provision has not been so limited. Following the decision in
People v May, it has been extended beyond the exclusionary
remedy of the Fourth Amendment to also encompass
substantive Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment. 78
After May, the Truth-in-Evidence provision can no longer be
considered the “discrete” and “isolated” restriction of
constitutional criminal procedural rights the voters intended it
to be. In expanding the Truth-in-Evidence provision, the May
court failed to address the constitutional issues involved. The
result is that the decision in May conflicts with the
jurisprudence of state constitutional rights expressed in Raven
and Strauss. To resolve this conflict, we conclude that May
was wrongly decided and that the Truth-in-Evidence provision
should be confined to the narrower contours defined by Raven
and Strauss. 79
Finally, if the initiative were not meant to extend so far, is
it a separation of powers violation for the judiciary, on its own
initiative and by interpretation, to so reduce state
constitutional rights? One must conclude that it would be. The
fundamental purpose of the judicial interpretive task is to

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 355.
See discussion infra Part IV.
People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309 (1988). See discussion infra Part III(C).
See discussion infra Part IV(B).
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divine and effectuate the intent of the lawmaker. In this
instance, the Truth-in-Evidence provision properly should be
read to include only the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
For the courts to extend an initiative constitutional
amendment beyond the electorate’s intent is to exceed the
judicial function, and to invade the people’s lawmaking
province. Indeed, if it is beyond the electorate’s initiative
power of amendment to deprive a minority group of the entire
protection of a fundamental constitutional right, then it is even
farther from contemplation for the judiciary to accomplish that
result.
II.

PROPOSITION 8 AND THE TRUTH-IN-EVIDENCE
PROVISION

A. The Origins of Proposition 8
On June 8, 1982, the electorate approved Proposition 8, an
initiative constitutional amendment entitled “The Victims’ Bill
of Rights.” 80 Proposition 8 contained numerous changes to
criminal law and criminal procedure. 81 Most importantly, it
added the Truth-in-Evidence provision as Article I, Section 28,
subdivision (d) of the California Constitution:
Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute
hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership
in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not
be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial
and post-conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or
hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard
in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this Section shall
affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, sections 352, 782 or
1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory or constitutional right of the press. 82

As one commentator said, “the origins of Proposition 8
remain obscure to all but its drafters.” 83 But it seems clear to
80. For background on Proposition 8, see Grover C. Trask & Timothy J.
Searight, Proposition 8 and the Exclusionary Rule: Towards a New Balance of
Defendant and Victim Rights, 23 Pac. L.J. 1101, 1102 (1992).
81. See generally Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982) for other aspects
of Proposition 8.
82. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d).
83. Jeff Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact—A Public Defender’s
Perspective, 23 PAC. L.J. 881, 883 (1992).
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us that Proposition 8 was part of the reaction against the
expansion of protections for criminal defendants by the federal
and state courts. 84 Certainly the use of state constitutions to
grant more protections to criminal defendants than what was
required under the federal constitution was a live issue in
1982. 85 A useful comparison here is a Florida constitutional
amendment in 1982, which required that state constitution’s
search and seizure provision to be “construed in conformity”
with the Fourth Amendment “as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.” 86
The Florida constitutional
amendment plainly states its intended application to a
substantive interpretation of a constitutional right. 87 In
contrast, although the rule on evidence admissibility in
Proposition 8 (“relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding”) 88 is broad, its relationship to
constitutional rights is not so obvious. Because of or despite
this fact, the courts have interpreted it expansively over time
to include virtually every aspect of constitutional criminal
procedure. 89 As discussed in the next section, that erroneously
broad interpretation has resulted in the practical elimination
of independent state grounds as a basis for constitutional
criminal procedure doctrine in California. 90
B. How Proposition 8 Has Been Interpreted For Search
And Seizure
The Truth-in-Evidence provision received its first
significant constitutional challenge concerning the issue of
search and seizure in In re Lance W. 91 In that case, the court
considered the impact of the Truth-in-Evidence provision on
previous California decisions that required exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure
provisions of the federal or the state constitutions, “under
84. See discussion supra Introduction.
85. See Van de Kamp, supra note 19, at 1111–12.
86. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (adopted 1982).
87. Id.
88. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d).
89. See infra Part IV(A).
90. See infra Part II(B).
91. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879 (1985). The California Supreme
Court had earlier denied challenges to Proposition 8 based on the single-issue
rule and the revision/amendment rule in Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236,
253, 257 (1982).
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circumstances in which the evidence would be admissible
under federal constitutional principles.” 92 Before the Truth-inEvidence provision, California courts could, via the so-called
“vicarious exclusionary rule,” exclude evidence illegally seized
from a third party under Article I, Section 13 of the California
Constitution. 93 The question in In re Lance W. was whether
the vicarious exclusionary rule was abrogated by the Truth-inEvidence provision. 94
The California vicarious exclusionary rule provided more
protection than that provided by the federal constitution, 95
because the United States Supreme Court had held that a
defendant could only raise a personal Fourth Amendment
claim, not one based on the violation of a third party. 96 Thus,
the questions before the court in In re Lance W. were:
1) whether the vicarious exclusionary rule based on the
California Constitution survived the Truth-in-Evidence
provision; and 2) whether any right to suppress evidence under
the California Constitution survived beyond the minimum set
by the federal constitution. 97
The court concluded in In re Lance W. that neither
California’s vicarious exclusionary rule nor any exclusionary
rule broader than that of the federal constitution survived the
Truth-in-Evidence provision. 98 In reaching this conclusion the
majority pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s recent
announcement in United States v. Leon that the federal
exclusionary rule, “although once described as an essential
part of the constitutional guarantee has more recently been
described by the United States Supreme Court as ‘a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved.’ ” 99
Importantly, the In re Lance W. decision noted that the
92. Id. at 879.
93. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 760–61 (1955); People v. Brisendine,
13 Cal. 3d 528, 549 (1975).
94. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 879.
95. Id. at 884
96. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139–40 (1978); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
97. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 879.
98. Id. at 886–87.
99. Id. at 881–82 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974) (internal citations omitted).
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Truth-in-Evidence provision had repealed neither Section 13
(the right against unreasonable searches and seizures) nor
Section 24 (independent state grounds) of Article I of the
California Constitution. 100 Instead, the court concluded that
the Truth-in-Evidence provision had a limited impact: “What
Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created remedy
for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the federal
or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so
obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally
compelled.” 101
In re Lance W. therefore framed the issue as whether
Proposition 8 eliminated “judicially created” criminal
procedure remedies—not whether any constitutional
provisions were repealed, nor whether any individual
constitutional rights were diminished or eliminated. 102 This
distinction was possible because of the characterization of the
federal exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon as a remedy
for the violation of the Fourth Amendment constitutional right
against illegal searches and seizures, not as part of the right
itself. 103 By viewing the issue as concerning only what remedy
is available, not the scope of the underlying right, the majority
avoided directly confronting the issue of whether Proposition 8
affected individual liberty under the California Constitution.
The In re Lance W. court did include a gratuitous observation
that “[t]he people could by amendment of the Constitution
repeal Section 13 of Article I in its entirety.” 104 But the court
immediately qualified this dicta by emphasizing that the
Truth-in-Evidence provision affected “only one incident of that
guarantee of freedom from unlawful search and seizure, a
judicially created remedy for violation of that guarantee.” 105
Most importantly, the In re Lance W. decision said nothing
about the effect of Proposition 8 on the right against selfincrimination in Article 1, Section 15 that “Persons may not . . .
be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against
themselves . . . .” 106

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 886.
Id. at 886–87.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.
In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 892.
Id. at 892.
CAL. CONST. art I, § 15.
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Following the decision in In re Lance W., it should have
been settled law that the intent of the Truth-in-Evidence
provision was to roll back the search and seizure exclusionary
rule under the state constitution. The next section explores
how, despite the reading in In re Lance W. limiting the Truthin-Evidence provision to “only one incident of that guarantee
of freedom from unlawful search and seizure, a judicially
created remedy for violation of that guarantee,” 107 the court
later expanded Proposition 8 to include the state constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
C. How Proposition 8 Has Been Interpreted For
Confessions
The next significant set of cases involving the Truth-inEvidence provision and constitutional criminal procedure
involved the California constitutional analog to federal Fifth
Amendment Miranda doctrine concerning compelled police
interrogations. Under federal law, statements obtained in
violation of Miranda can be used to impeach a defendant who
testifies. 108 But the California Supreme Court had provided
more protection under the state constitution, holding in People
v. Disbrow that such statements were inadmissible under the
California Constitution. 109 The question of whether the rule in
Disbrow survived the passage of the Truth-in-Evidence
provision was taken up in People v. May. 110
In the first decision in that case (May I), Justice Mosk
wrote the majority opinion, which held that Disbrow survived
because the law of privileges (including the Disbrow rule) was
codified in Evidence Code section 940 and so it fell under
Proposition 8’s savings clause, which stated that the Truth-inEvidence provision would not affect any existing statutory rule
of evidence relating to privilege. 111 Justice Lucas dissented,
contending that the majority was mistaken in preserving “in
the form of a ‘statutory privilege,’ a judicially created
exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United States
107. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 892.
108. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). We discuss Harris in detail
infra Part III(C).
109. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 115 (1976). See discussion infra
Part III(C).
110. People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 311 (1988).
111. People v. May, 729 P.2d 778, 784–85 (1987).

KAISER FINAL

54

1/4/2016 9:52 AM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Supreme Court under the federal Constitution.” 112 Justice
Lucas contended that “[i]t was precisely this kind of reliance
upon the state Constitution to avoid applicable decisions of the
United States Supreme Court that Proposition 8 was intended
to preclude.” 113
In the November 1986 election, the voters did not retain
Chief Justice Bird and Associate Justices Grodin and
The newly-reconstituted California Supreme
Reynoso. 114
Court then granted a motion for rehearing in May. In 1988,
this time with the new Chief Justice Lucas writing for the
majority, the May II opinion held that Disbrow had been
abrogated by the Truth-in-Evidence provision. 115
The May II opinion quoted the language in In re Lance W.
describing Proposition 8 as eliminating “a judicially created
remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of
the federal or state Constitutions” and stating that
[i]mplicit in the limitation on the courts’ power to exclude
relevant evidence to the enumerated statutory exceptions
is a limitation on the power of the court to create
nonstatutory exclusionary rules, whether denominated
rules of procedure, rules of evidence, or substantive rules,
for the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence if those rules
afford greater protection to a criminal defendant than does
the Fourth Amendment. 116

The May II opinion then applied the same analysis to
provisions under Miranda doctrine, extending the scope of the
Truth-in-Evidence provision to “the constitutional rights to
counsel and rights against self-incrimination” because the
“reasoning and result” were “equally applicable.” 117 The court
gave the following rationale: “Both kinds of exclusionary rules
are addressed to evidence obtained by police conduct in
violation of constitutional provisions. Both are based on the

112. Id. at 798 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. See John W. Poulos, Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the
Emergence of the Lucas Court in California, 23 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 157, 217 (1990);
Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial
Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate,
59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 809, 812, 858–59 (1986).
115. People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 319–20 (1988).
116. Id. at 311.
117. Id. at 311.
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same rationale of deterring unlawful police conduct.” 118
The opinion in May II treated the substantive law of both
search and seizure and of self-incrimination as mere
exclusionary rules, instead of analyzing each doctrine in terms
of the underlying constitutional values that it protects. 119 That
conflation of two distinct areas of constitutional criminal
procedural rights had a sweeping impact on the state
constitution. As discussed below, this error led to the practical
elimination of independent state grounds as a basis for
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine in California. This
in turn created the kind of impermissible deprivation of a
minority group’s entire protection of a fundamental
constitutional right that Raven and Strauss forbid.
III.

HOW PROPOSITION 8 SHOULD BE READ

A. The Current Understanding of Proposition 8 is Flawed
We argue that the Truth-in-Evidence provision should not
apply to the state right against self-incrimination for two
reasons. First, the best reading of the measure’s text is that it
applies only to statutory rules concerning the admission of
evidence, and not to constitutional rights. Second, to the
extent that the measure does affect constitutional rights,
fundamental differences between the right against selfincrimination and the right against illegal searches and
seizures compel a different treatment of evidence under the
Truth-in-Evidence provision.
The relationship between the text of the Truth-inEvidence provision and specified state constitutional rights is
unclear. The Truth-in-Evidence provision states, “relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.” 120
This is unlike the Florida constitutional amendment
mentioned above, which specified that the state constitution’s
search and seizure provision must “be construed in conformity
with the Fourth Amendment . . . as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.” 121 It also is unlike Proposition 115,
which expressly applied to all constitutional criminal

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 311.
See discussion infra Part IV.
CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(f)(2).
FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
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procedural rights in the California Constitution. 122 Instead,
the text of the Truth-in-Evidence provision parallels California
Evidence Code section 351, which states: “Except as otherwise
provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.” 123
Therefore, the text of the Truth-in-Evidence provision is
focused on the admission and exclusion of evidence—under the
law of evidence, rather than on specified state constitutional
rights.
This is significant because, although state
constitutional rights are sometimes implicated by the
exclusion of evidence—as discussed below, particularly the
right against illegal searches and seizures—the admission and
exclusion of evidence often does not necessarily implicate
constitutional rights. Indeed, the Truth-in-Evidence provision
has been applied broadly in statutory (non-constitutional)
areas of the admission of evidence. 124 Thus, the text of the
Truth-in-Evidence provision supports the conclusion that it
was meant to apply to rules for evidence exclusion, not to
reduce or eliminate any constitutional rights.
At one point, the California Supreme Court appeared to
reject the argument that the Truth-in-Evidence provision
applies only to the search and seizure exclusionary rule. In
People v. Harris, the court noted that the existence of the
provision’s “savings clause” is a textual indication that its
scope was broader than the area of searches and seizures: “Had
the intent been limited to rules governing the admissibility of
evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure,
there would have been no necessity to except expressly ‘any
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or
Evidence Code sections 352, 782, or 1103.’ ” 125 But this
statement was made in a case deciding the effect of the Truthin-Evidence provision on statutory rules concerning the
admissibility of evidence. Thus, while the textual language of
the savings clause indicates the provision’s intention to
122. See discussion infra, Part IV.
123. Cal. Evid. Code, § 351.
124. See People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1081 & n.14 (1989) which held that
Evidence Code 790, which prohibits the admissibility of evidence of good
character of a witness to support credibility unless evidence of bad character has
been admitted, was abrogated in criminal cases because of the Truth-in-Evidence
provision of Proposition 8. See also People v. Wheeler, 4 Cal. 4th 284, 288 (1992)
abrogating the felony-convictions-only rule of witness impeachment in criminal
cases under Evidence Code section 788.
125. People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1082 (1989).
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broadly cover statutory rules of evidence, it does not in itself
indicate whether the provision was intended to cover
constitutional rights.
The Truth-in-Evidence provision’s
interaction with constitutional rights is precisely the area
where the provision is unclear, and Harris does not address
that issue.
A seemingly plausible alternate interpretation is that the
Truth-in-Evidence provision raises the admissibility of
evidence at criminal trial to the status of a paramount state
constitutional principle that subordinates all other state
constitutional rights. But it is difficult to justify such a new
principle with the traditional vocabulary of individual state
rights. Could one conclude that Proposition 8 (which after all
was entitled the “The Victims’ Bill of Rights”) created a new
right for the victims of crime to have all relevant evidence be
admitted in court in a criminal trial? Not easily. In fact, the
California Supreme Court rejected that interpretation of the
Victim’s Bill of Rights, on the traditional ground that it is the
people of California generally who bring a criminal case
against a criminal defendant, not the individual crime
victim. 126 Or could one say that the people (through their
representative the District Attorney) have the new individual
right of admitting all relevant evidence in a criminal trial? 127
Again, this formulation strains against the traditional
conception of rights—especially constitutional criminal
procedural rights—as individual rights against the
prosecutorial power of the state. 128
In any event, the California Supreme Court has never
addressed Proposition 8 in such terms. Instead, the court’s
decisions concerning Proposition 8 in In re Lance W. and People
v. May have been phrased in terms of the elimination of
remedies, rather than a wholesale subordination of rights. Nor
do Raven and Strauss discuss the Truth-in-Evidence provision
in terms of elevating admissibility over individual
constitutional rights. And such a wholesale elevation of a
judicial remedy, or a rule of evidence, above all state
constitutional rights is incompatible with Strauss’s

126. Dix v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 442, 451–452 (1991) .
127. The people do have at least one constitutional procedural right in a
criminal case: the right to a speedy trial. CAL. CONST. art I, § 29.
128. See generally Kaiser, supra note 48, at 266–67.
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characterization of the 1982 Proposition 8 as a “discrete
restriction[] on state constitutional protections.” 129
This textual analysis shows there is at best weak support
for the current understanding of the Truth-in-Evidence
provision. The scope of the Truth-in-Evidence provision
therefore should be reconsidered in light of Raven and Strauss.
Specifically, it should be re-examined in terms of the
constitutional issues surrounding the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. Because of the attenuated relationship
between the exclusionary rule and the core right of the Fourth
Amendment, the California Supreme Court in In re Lance W.
properly subordinated the state exclusionary rule for searches
and seizures to the Truth-in-Evidence provision. 130 But the
May II decision incorrectly expanded that rationale to other
constitutional rights, particularly the Fifth Amendment
Miranda protections against self-incrimination, where that
rationale has no application. 131 The next section shows how
the fundamental difference between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments compels different treatment of each right under
the Truth-in-Evidence provision.
B. The Difference Between the Core Constitutional Rights
Protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
Requires Them to be Treated Differently Under the
Truth-in-Evidence Provision
1. Revisiting the Right/Remedy Distinction
The decision in In re Lance W. drew a distinction between
(1) the “substantive scope” of the California constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure and (2) the
exclusionary rule for excluding illegally seized evidence, which
it characterized as a “judicially created remedy” designed to
deter police violations of that right. 132 In doing so, the
California Supreme Court was following Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Leon. 133 We discuss this Fourth
129. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 444 n. 22.
130. See discussion supra Part II(B).
131. See discussion infra Part III(C).
132. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 882, 886–87.
133. The phrase “judicially created remedy” is quoted from United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
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Amendment jurisprudence in detail below and show how the
California Supreme Court erred in People v. May by extending
the Fourth Amendment right/remedy distinction into issues
involving the Fifth Amendment.
At the outset, we note that the right/remedy distinction is
not sharply defined in legal doctrine. For example, there is the
well-known legal maxim that there is no right without a
remedy. 134 When remedy is discussed at this high level of
abstraction, any right must have some remedy associated with
it to have any force as a right. But there is nonetheless a
meaningful distinction in various instances between the core
of a right and a so-called remedy that vindicates the right. If
a so-called remedy has a strong relationship to the core right it
protects—indeed, if the core right can only be vindicated by a
certain so-called remedy—then the so-called remedy can be
considered to be “mandated” or “compelled” by the core right. 135
In such a case, the remedy is better classed as part of the
substantive scope of the right. As we discuss below, the
exclusion of compelled confessions under the right against selfincrimination is such an instance. In contrast, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence holds that the search and seizure
exclusionary rule, while helping to promote the values
associated with the Fourth Amendment right, is peripheral to
the core right. But exclusion of a coerced confession at trial is
not merely peripheral to the right against self-incrimination;
instead, it necessarily flows from the core value of the right.
The decision in In re Lance W. appears to assume that the
mere fact of “judicial creation” makes the search and seizure
exclusionary rule a remedy rather than part of the substantive
right. 136 But the happenstance that a rule is first announced
in a court decision does not compel the conclusion that it is only
a remedy. Constitutional rights and their scope are not selfinterpreting. The scope of constitutional rights is developed in
judicial opinions.
To call all judicial interpretation of
constitutional rights into question is obviously untenable. 137

134. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163–66 (1803).
135. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 889–90.
136. “The fact remains, however, that both rules [the search and seizure
exclusionary rule and the vicarious search and seizure exclusionary rule] are of
judicial creation, and relate to remedy rather than the scope of substantive rights
protected by either Constitution [federal and state].” Id. at 887.
137. See discussion infra Part III.
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The In re Lance W. court’s emphasis on the “judiciallycreated” nature of the search and seizure exclusionary rule is
therefore only comprehensible in light of the specific history of
the exclusionary rule. By the time In re Lance W. was decided,
the U.S. Supreme Court had already held in United States v.
Leon that the search and seizure exclusionary rule was not
mandated by the Fourth Amendment right itself. 138 The result
in In re Lance W. that the Truth-in-Evidence provision
abrogated the California search and seizure exclusionary rule
flows naturally from that conclusion. But it does not follow
from Leon that anything that can be described as an
exclusionary rule is an optional judicially-created remedy. As
we discuss below, in the context of the right against selfincrimination, the requirement of excluding unlawfully
obtained confessions has been held to be mandated by, and
therefore part of, the right itself.
Thus, to describe the action of excluding a confession,
required to protect the core Fifth Amendment right, as a
“remedy” wrongly conflates two distinct constitutional rights
on the basis of nothing more than facially-similar terminology
and passes over the substantive difference between the two
concepts. That was the error in May II, where the decision
simply cited the language from In re Lance W. on judiciallycreated exclusionary rules, assumed that exclusion under
Miranda was another judicially-created remedy, and failed to
engage in a substantive analysis of the underlying
constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under
Article I, Section 15 of the California Constitution. 139
2. Analogous Constitutional Rights Under the
Federal and State Constitutions
Before we turn to our substantive analysis of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination, we first address
a threshold question: What is the relationship between federal
constitutional doctrine and state constitutional provisions with
identically or similarly-worded provisions? United States
Supreme Court decisions concerning federal constitutional
rights are, of course, the final word in the federal system. Now
138. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
139. People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 316.
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that most of the Bill of Rights applies to the states, federal
constitutional law provides a “floor” for individual rights,
below which states cannot go. But federalism allows the states
to raise the “ceiling” by interpreting state constitutional rights
more expansively than their federal analogues. 140
Given that federalism allows for more expansive
interpretations of state constitutional rights, the next question
is: when would a state court be justified in doing so? The
California rule is that Article I, Section 24 of the California
Constitution provides authority to interpret rights in the state
constitution differently from their federal analogues. 141 It is
true that the California Supreme Court sometimes defers to
the United States Supreme Court in interpreting analogous
constitutional language. 142 But deference is not required: “it is
one thing voluntarily to defer to high court decisions, but quite
another to mandate the state courts’ blind obedience thereto,
despite ‘cogent reasons.’ ” 143 Thus, California courts remain
free to construe state constitutional rights above the floor set
by their federal analogues when “cogent reasons” exist. 144
While federalism thus allows the scope of California
constitutional rights to be more expansive than what is
dictated by federal constitutional doctrine, federal
constitutional doctrine nonetheless remains relevant to
discussing rights under the California Constitution. The right
against self-incrimination or the right against illegal searches
and seizures under the federal constitution and the California
Constitution are, in some sense, versions of the same right. 145
The state bills of rights of the original thirteen states
influenced the formulation of the Bill of Rights of the federal
constitution, which in turn influenced the bill of rights in
subsequent state constitutions, such as that of the California

140. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037–44 (1983); People v. Fields 13
Cal. 4th 289, 298 (1996).
141. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353–54.
142. Id.
143. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353.
144. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at (354).
145. One way of explaining this is to view these constitutional rights as part
of a continuous common law tradition. See e.g. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at
120, (Richardson, J., dissenting) (“the privilege against self-incrimination is a
single common law privilege which existed long before its incorporation into
either the United States or California Constitution.”) It is beyond the scope of
this Article to discuss the theoretical issues raised by such a view.
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Constitution. 146 In the next section, we therefore examine
some of the fundamental features of the right against selfincrimination and the right against illegal searches and
seizures as expressed in federal constitutional doctrine, which
are likewise relevant to discussing the fundamental features of
these rights under the California Constitution.
3. The Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination
Exclusionary Rules Are Analytically Distinct
The original constitutional rationale for the federal
exclusionary rule involved cases in which the seized evidence
(such as a defendant’s diary or papers) implicated the Fifth
But the
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 147
federal exclusionary rule was eventually expanded to cover all
seized evidence, which makes the exact constitutional basis of
the federal exclusionary rule uncertain. 148 When the United
States Supreme Court first applied the Fourth Amendment to
the states in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court declined to extend the
federal exclusionary rule to the states, because it “was not
derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment,” nor “based on legislation expressing
Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution.” 149
And when the federal exclusionary rule was finally applied to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, several justices dissented, as they
regarded the exclusionary rule as “but a remedy which, by
penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deterring such
conduct in the future.” 150
Legal scholars have analytically distinguished between

146. Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions Of The Founding Decade:
Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution And Its Influences On American
Constitutionalism, 62 Temple L. Rev. 541, 541–47; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE
LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Oxford University Press 2009) 65–71;
Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American
Revolution, 24 Rutgers L. J. 911, 911 (1993); PAUL MASON, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 114 (California State Legislature Press 2015) .
147. “The paradigm here was a diary wrongfully seized from a criminal
defendant and then read against him at trial: reading the diary in court was itself
seen as akin to compelling a defendant to ‘witness’ against himself, in violation
of self-incrimination principles.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 151 (2012).
148. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) 20–31.
149. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
150. Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961).
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exclusion under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. As
Professor Amar puts it: “Under the Fifth Amendment,
excluding evidence is not a remedy for an earlier constitutional
violation, but a prevention of the violation itself. A Fifth
Amendment wrong occurs only at trial, when testimony is
introduced ‘in a[] criminal case.’ ” 151 In contrast, exclusion
under Mapp “is simply not linked, analytically speaking, to the
scope of the violation, which occurs before a criminal trial, not
during it.” 152
In United States v. Leon, the United States Supreme Court
adopted the view that the Mapp exclusionary rule is a remedy
rather than part of the core constitutional right. 153 The Leon
majority stated that the “Fourth Amendment contains no
provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in
violation of its commands” and “the use of fruits of a past
unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment
wrong.’ ” 154
Because “the wrong condemned by the
Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful search or
seizure itself,” “the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor
able to ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has
already suffered.’ ” 155 Therefore Leon concluded: “The rule . . .
operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.’ ” 156
In contrast, the Fifth Amendment protections announced
in Miranda followed the opposite constitutional trajectory.
Initially, the United States Supreme Court referred to the
Miranda protections as “prophylactic factors” rather than as
constitutional rights. 157 But in Dickerson v. United States, the
high court ultimately reaffirmed the constitutional status of
Miranda, acknowledging that “Miranda announced a
151. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) 24 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V).
152. Id. at 158; See also Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New
York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214–1215 (1971).
153. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
154. Id. at 906 (citing U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
155. Id. (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976)).
156. Id. (citing U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
157. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). See also New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (citing Michigan v. Tucker).
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constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede
legislatively.” 158 Thus, while the Mapp exclusionary rule is
now regarded as a mere remedy, rather than as something
mandated by the Fourth Amendment, Miranda is still viewed
as a constitutional rule required by the core constitutional
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 159
C. Because Exclusion Under The Fourth And Fifth
Amendments Is Not Constitutionally Equivalent, May
II Was Wrongly Decided
The decision in May II applied the Truth-in-Evidence
provision to the state constitutional right against selfincrimination. That application was flawed because May II
assumed, without any constitutional analysis, that exclusion
under the right against self-incrimination should be treated as
if it were equivalent for all purposes to the search and seizure
exclusionary rule and therefore be subsumed as a mere
remedy. Justice Mosk concisely made this point in his dissent:
“Whatever its validity in search-and-seizure jurisprudence—in
which the constitutional guarantee is generally believed not to
require the exclusion of evidence—the ‘right/remedy’
distinction seems particularly out of place in the law of
privilege against self-incrimination—which . . . necessarily
bars admission of certain evidence.” 160
Applying this constitutional distinction (which the May II
majority failed to do) compels the conclusion that May II was
wrongly decided. May II abrogated the California Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Disbrow, 161 which itself declined
to follow the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Harris
v. New York. 162 Harris dealt with the scope of exclusion under
the federal Fifth Amendment Miranda right. 163 The question
was whether the scope of exclusion included a defendant’s
statements used for impeachment.
Harris held that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda can be used for
the purpose of impeaching a defendant, if the defendant
158. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
159. On restrictions on Miranda, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224
(1970); see also discussion infra Part V(C).
160. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 327 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
161. Id. at 315.
162. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113 (1976).
163. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1970).
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decides to testify. 164 But the Harris court failed to present a
constitutional rationale for this holding, and that failure
inspired significant criticism of the decision. 165
There is little basis to defend Harris. There is no
satisfactory explanation for its implicit equation of exclusion
under the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments. Although the
Miranda doctrine is based on the Fifth Amendment’s right
against self-incrimination, Harris relied on a Fourth
Amendment case as precedent. 166 Harris cited Walder v.
United States, which held that physical evidence, seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and inadmissible in the
case-in-chief, could be used for impeachment purposes. 167
Other than that weak reed, the constitutional basis for the
Harris majority to apply a Fourth Amendment precedent to
Miranda is unclear. Harris held that statements illegally
taken in violation of the Miranda admonitions are nonetheless
reliable—an echo of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
critics, who objected that illegally seized physical evidence was
nonetheless reliable, despite the fact that it was illegally
seized. 168 If one is unconcerned about the reliability of illegally
seized things, the Harris court seems to imply, why worry
about the reliability of an illegal confession?
But Fifth Amendment concerns about compulsion are
broader than just reliability—government compulsion of the
individual is itself a violation of the right against selfincrimination. 169 The conflation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments in Harris ignores the element of government
coercion implicit in custodial interrogation. 170 Unlike the

164. Id. at 225.
165. For criticisms of Harris, see, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely,
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L. J. 1198, 1214–15 (1971); 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE (2d ed. 1987) § 11.6(a), p. 485.
166. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224, citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
167. Id.
168. “The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the
jury in assessing petitioner’s credibility, and the benefits of this should process
not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible
police conduct will be encouraged thereby.” Harris 401 U.S. at 225.
169. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385–86 (1963).
170. “It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the
use of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of
confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of
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evidence that existed independently before the police illegally
seized it, the confession did not exist until the police created it.
Thus, the confession would not exist but for the fact that the
police unlawfully interrogated the defendant. Harris is silent
on this central Fifth Amendment constitutional concern. 171
Harris applied just one limitation from the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule context to Miranda. 172 Because
Harris stated no constitutional rationale for this application, it
established no general constitutional rule equating exclusion
under Miranda with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule. 173 Harris should therefore be limited to its holding. This
is how the California Supreme Court treated the Harris
decision in People v. Disbrow, 174 and properly so. While
Disbrow acknowledged that Harris had limited the scope of
exclusion under the federal Miranda right, Disbrow found
Harris to be an unpersuasive basis for an impeachment
exception to the state right against self-incrimination under
Article I, Section 15 of the California Constitution. 175 The
California Supreme Court therefore declined to apply the
Harris impeachment exception to the state privilege against
self-incrimination, holding instead that the state constitution
granted greater protection than that provided by the federal
constitution. 176 That holding was correct because, as discussed
above, nothing in Harris compelled the conclusion that
exclusion under Miranda was constitutionally equivalent to
the Mapp exclusionary rule.
Harris was therefore
unpersuasive in compelling a general reconsideration of the
scope of the constitutional Miranda rights, and the California
Supreme Court in Disbrow was acting within its role by
declining to correspondingly limit the scope of the state right.
But the May II decision ignored the constitutional issues
analyzed in Disbrow and limited the scope of the state

the ‘strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are
sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a
conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will’ [citation] . . . .”
Id.
171. Harris, 401 U.S. at 222.
172. Id. at 224.
173. See generally id.
174. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113 (1976).
175. Id. at 110, fn. 9.
176. Id. at 127.
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constitutional right under the guise of limiting a remedy. 177
Thus, there are two major analytical flaws in May II.
First, May II wrongly assumed that exclusion of evidence
under the right against self-incrimination is the same as
exclusion under the search and seizure exclusionary rule: a
mere remedy. As we have shown, however, the exclusion of
evidence under the right against self-incrimination is a
constitutional rule required by the core of that constitutional
privilege. Second, May II misread the text of the Truth-inEvidence provision, which concerns the law of evidence, not
state constitutional rights. 178 Thus, both the provision’s terms
and the relevant constitutional doctrine compel the conclusion
that the Truth-in-Evidence provision does not apply to the
state constitutional right against self-incrimination.
IV.

THE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS OF PROPOSITION 8
CREATE A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

A. The Constitutional Problem Is The Conflict Between
The Cumulative Effects of May And The Limits on
Initiatives Announced In Raven And Strauss
Following the decisions in In re Lance W. and May II,
Proposition 8 has been used to eliminate independent state
grounds for the exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence
(whether physical evidence or statements), leaving the federal
Constitution as the sole basis for exclusion. To understand the
ultimate impact of the Truth-in-Evidence provision on state
constitutional rights, an overview perspective is required.
In 1989, Justice Mosk reviewed the cumulative effects of
Proposition 8 in People v. Markham. 179 In that case, the court
held that Proposition 8 abrogated People v. Jimenez, 180 which
had required the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a
defendant’s statement beyond a reasonable doubt before
introducing it at trial. 181 The Markham decision held that,

177. See discussion supra Part III(B).
178. See discussion supra Part III(A).
179. See People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 73 (1989) (Mosk, J., concurring) .
180. People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595 (1978), abrogated by People v.
Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63 (1989), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478
(1993).
181. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 65 (1989) (majority opinion) .
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following Proposition 8, the federal standard applied 182, which
only required a preponderance of the evidence. 183 Justice Mosk
wrote separately in Markham to note that while he was
compelled to concur in the majority opinion, “the blame for the
sorry situation in which we find ourselves must be placed
squarely on Proposition 8.” 184 Describing Proposition 8 as
“[t]hat ill-conceived measure” that “has struck down California
precedents on individual rights as it has encountered them in
its path of destruction,” Justice Mosk listed the following
constitutional criminal procedural cases “interred” by it: 185
People v. Disbrow, on prohibiting the use of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda for impeaching a defendant; 186
People v. Martin on the vicarious exclusionary rule; 187 and
People v. Pettingill on prohibiting any further interrogation by
police after a defendant has asserted his Miranda privileges. 188
After Justice Mosk’s concurrence in Markham, at least one
further state constitutional criminal procedural right was
abrogated by Proposition 8: People v. Aranda, dealing with the
right to confrontation under the California Constitution, was
abrogated to the extent it required a wider exclusion of
evidence than its federal Sixth Amendment counterpart. 189 In
People v. Boyd the court of appeal held that the Truth-inEvidence provision abrogated the Aranda rule to the extent
that it required the exclusion of the incriminating extrajudicial
statements of a codefendant, even if the declarant testified at
trial and was available for cross-examination. 190 And another
appellate decision subsequently held that Proposition 8 further
abrogated Aranda to the extent it prohibited the admission of
a codefendant’s statement incriminating the accused in a nonjury trial. 191

182. See id.
183. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) .
184. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 73 (Mosk, J., concurring).
185. Id.
186. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101 (1976) (abrogated by May, 44 Cal. 3d 309 (1988)).
187. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755 (1955) (abrogated by In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d
873 (1985)).
188. Pettingil, 21 Cal. 3d 231 (1978) (abrogated by People v. Warner, 203 Cal.
App. 3d 1122 (1988)).
189. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518 (1965) ; see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968).
190. People v. Boyd, 222 Cal. App. 3d 541, 562 (4th Dist. 1990).
191. People v. Walkkein, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1409 (2d Dist. 1993).
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Thus, the cumulative result is that state constitutional
criminal procedural rights have been effectively limited to no
more than that allowed by the federal constitution. The
problem presented by this cumulative effect is that this
situation conflicts with the California Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence of individual rights under the state constitution,
as expressed in Strauss and Raven. Strauss placed limits on
how broadly initiatives may remove individual rights from the
state constitution. And in Raven, the California Supreme
Court invalidated an initiative that sought to limit the ability
of the courts to construe criminal procedural rights under the
state constitution to be greater than that afforded by the
federal constitution. The conflict lies in the fact that the
decisions on state criminal procedure accomplish what Strauss
and Raven prohibit: eliminating criminal procedural rights
under the state constitution and the judiciary’s independent
role in interpreting them.
B. The Solution Is to Preserve Proposition 8 But to Apply
the Limits On Initiatives from Raven And Strauss
The solution to this constitutional dilemma is to apply the
limits placed on initiative restrictions on constitutional
criminal procedural rights by Raven and Strauss, with the
result that the decision in May II should be overturned and the
Truth-in-Evidence provision returned to its original scope as
only affecting remedies for Fourth Amendment violations. We
turn now to an analysis of Raven.
In the June 5, 1990 election, the voters adopted
Proposition 115 (the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act”). 192
Proposition 115 continued in the vein of Proposition 8 in
seeking to curtail California court decisions that had enlarged
constitutional criminal procedural rights. The preamble to
Proposition 115 stated that it “was necessary to reform the law
as developed in numerous California Supreme Court decisions
and as set forth in the statutes of this state,” and characterized
these decisions and statutes as having “unnecessarily
expanded the rights of accused criminals far beyond that which

192. Raven v. Deukmejian 52 Cal. 3d 336, 340 (1990). For a discussion of
Proposition 115 see Rachel A. Van Cleave, Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine
of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 95 (1993)
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is required by the United States Constitution.” 193 Proposition
115 contained numerous changes to criminal procedure and
substantive criminal law. 194 The most sweeping part of the
initiative was an addition to Article I, Section 24 of the
California Constitution, which prevented the California courts
from affording criminal defendant greater rights than those
afforded by the federal constitution. 195
Raven struck down this addition to Article I, Section 24,
rejecting it as “a constitutional revision beyond the scope of the
initiative process.” 196 In so doing the Raven court reaffirmed
the role of the state constitution in protecting constitutional
criminal procedural rights beyond those provided by the
federal constitution. Raven emphasized the historical role that
the California Constitution played in protecting the individual
liberties of citizens: “As an historical matter, Article I and its
Declaration of Rights was viewed as the only available
protection for our citizens charged with crimes, because the
federal Constitution and its Bill of Rights was initially deemed
to apply only to the conduct of the federal government.” 197
Raven acknowledged that the California Supreme Court had
sometimes deferred to the United States Supreme Court in
interpreting identical or similar constitutional language found
in the state and federal Constitutions, and that “cogent
reasons” must exist before the court would depart from the
construction placed by the Unites States Supreme Court on a

193. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 342.
194. Id. at 342–46.
195. CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 24, para. 2, in full:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws,
to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally
present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the
attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be
compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed
twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and to not suffer the imposition
of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this
State in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater
rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of
the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to
minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by
the Constitution of the United States.
196. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 351.
197. Id. at 352–53.
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similar provision in the federal constitution. 198 But the court
held that “it is one thing voluntarily to defer to high court
decisions, but quite another to mandate the state courts’ blind
obedience thereto, despite ‘cogent reasons.’ ” 199
The Raven court relied on the adoption of Article I, Section
24 in 1974 as confirming that the California court had the
authority to adopt an independent interpretation of the state
constitution. 200 And it pointed out that Article I, Section 24
had served as “the basis for numerous decisions interpreting
the state Constitution as extending protections to our citizens
beyond the limits imposed by the high court under the federal
Constitution” and cited eight cases. 201 In each of those
decisions, Raven noted, dissenting justices had argued against
an independent interpretation of the applicable state
constitutional provision, but “no dissenter ever suggested that
deference was compelled as a matter of constitutional
imperative.” 202 What Proposition 115 proposed to do was
different because it imposed “such an imperative for the first
time in California’s history.” 203 Raven therefore concluded that
it “substantially alters the preexisting constitutional scheme
or framework heretofore extensively and repeatedly used by
courts in interpreting and enforcing state constitutional
protections.” 204
In reviewing the past precedents for limiting
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state
constitution, the court referred to its decision on the Truth-inEvidence provision in In re Lance W. 205 Importantly, Raven
described the holding on the Truth-in-Evidence provision as
affecting only the exclusionary remedy: “In In re Lance W. we
upheld a provision limiting the state exclusionary remedy for
search and seizure violations to the boundaries fixed by the
Fourth Amendment.” 206 But Raven did not mention that
198. Id. at 353.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 353; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 24 states in pertinent part: “Rights
guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.”
201. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354.
202. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 355.
206. Id. (citation omitted).
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Proposition 8 had subsequently been applied well outside the
search and seizure context. Indeed, as Justice Mosk pointed
out in Markham in 1989 (just one year before Proposition 115),
Proposition 8 had been applied against many areas of criminal
procedural rights previously protected by the California
Constitution. 207 In fact, six of the eight cases that Raven cited
as examples of the courts’ ability to extend greater protections
to individuals under the state constitution had already been
abrogated by Proposition 8 when Raven was decided. 208 Two of
those cases involved the exclusionary rule under Article I,
Section 13, the state constitutional analogue of the Fourth
Amendment: People v. Brisendine 209 and People v. Norman. 210
But four of these cases involved criminal procedural rights
under Article I, Section 15, the state constitutional analogue to
the Fifth Amendment: People v. Houston 211; People v.

207. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 72 (1989) (Mosk, J. concurring). See supra
Section III(d).
208. The two cases cited by Raven that had not been abrogated by the Truthin-Evidence provision—People v. Ramos, and People v. Hannon—did not involve
the exclusion of evidence. Ramos dealt with a statutory requirement in
California’s death penalty law that the jury be instructed that a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole might be commuted or modified by the
Governor to a sentence that included the possibility of parole, the so-called
“Briggs instruction.” See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 995, fn. 4 (1983).
Hannon dealt with a defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the California
constitution, Article I, Section 15, clause 1. See People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588,
605 (1977).
209. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528 (1975) (abrogated by In re Lance W,
37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985)). Brisendine held that the state constitution was more
restrictive of warrantless searches than the federal constitution as interpreted in
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973). Brisendine also reaffirmed the vicarious exclusionary rule for third
parties under the state constitution.
210. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 939 (1975) (abrogated by In re Lance
W, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879 (1985) A). Norman followed Brisendine, and was similarly
abrogated by In re Lance W. See John K. Van de Kamp and Richard W. Gerry,
Reforming the Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to
the California constitution, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 1109, 1114, fn. 19 (1982).
211. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595 (1986) (abrogated by People v.
Ledesma, 204 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691 (1988)). Houston expanded the Miranda
protections under the state constitution beyond that decided by the United States
Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 42 Cal. 3d at 609–10.
Houston held that whether or not a suspect in custody had previously waived his
rights to silence and counsel, the police may not deny him the opportunity, before
questioning begins or resumes, to meet with his retained or appointed counsel
who had taken diligent steps to come to his aid. Id. at 610.
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Pettingill 212; People v. Disbrow 213; and People v. Bustamante. 214
Raven rejected Proposition 115 based on the revision/
amendment rule, federalism, and separation of powers
concerns. As Raven concluded, the central problem with
Proposition 115 was that it sought to require the California
Supreme Court to interpret the state constitution as to
constitutional criminal procedural rights for criminal
defendants in lockstep with the federal constitution, thus
placing all authority in the United States Supreme Court. 215
By focusing on the federalism and separation of powers
concerns, the Raven court avoided directly confronting the
question of how far an initiative could go in removing
previously-recognized rights under the state constitution.
That issue was finally confronted in Strauss. 216 Thus, while
Raven focused on the issue of limiting the state courts’ ability
to interpret rights under the state constitution, until Strauss it
remained an open issue how far an initiative could go in
changing the state constitutional rights to be interpreted by
state courts.
This distinction raises an important question: What if the
constitutional amendment of Proposition 115 had been written

212. People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231 (1978) (abrogated by People v.
Warner, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1122, 1124 (1988). Pettingill expanded the Miranda
protections under the state constitution beyond that decided by the United States
Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 21 Cal. 3d at 246–51.
Pettingill held that after a defendant had demonstrated he did not wish to waive
his privilege against self-incrimination, the police could not lawfully subject him
to a new round of interrogation even if they repeated the Miranda warnings. Id.
at 238, 246.
213. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101 (1976) 1 (abrogated by People v. May,
44 Cal. 3d 309, 311 (1988) 2). Disbrow expanded the Miranda protections under
the state constitution beyond the federal protection of Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1970). 16 Cal. 3d at 113 3. Disbrow held that statements taken in
violation of Miranda were inadmissible for impeaching the testimony of a
defendant. Id.
214. People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88 (1981) 5 (abrogated by Grand Jury
of San Diego County ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court (Harrison), 259 Cal. Rptr.
404, 411, n.8 (1989) (unpublished; previously published at 211 Cal. App. 3d 740)
6). Abrogation affirmed in People v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 4th 1183, 1222 (1992).
Bustamante expanded a defendant’s right to counsel at a line-up to include the
right to counsel at a pre-indictment line-up notwithstanding Kirby v. Illinois 406
U.S. 682 (1972) limits such right to post-indictment line-up only. 16 Cal. 3d at
98–99. Bustamante held that a defendant had the right to counsel at a preindictment lineup. Id. at 99.
215. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 353 (1990).
216. See supra Part I.
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as “This Constitution does not afford greater rights to criminal
defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the
United States,” instead of “This Constitution shall not be
construed by the court to afford greater rights to criminal
defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the
Arguably, this re-written version of
United States”? 217
Proposition 115 might still implicate federalism concerns to
the extent that the scope of constitutional rights would still be
handed over to the United State Supreme Court and the state
court would be preemptively prevented from expanding
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state
constitution. But there is no obvious obstacle under Raven or
Strauss to rolling back specified constitutional criminal
procedural rights in the state constitution. After Strauss, the
question is not whether the electorate may act on constitutional
rights, but to what degree. 218 Thus, an initiative constitutional
amendment could provide, for example, that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures under the state
constitution does not include the vicarious exclusionary rule
announced in People v. Martin, 219 or that the right not to be
compelled to be a witness against oneself under the state
constitution does not preclude the use of statements taken
outside of Miranda to be used as impeachment evidence
against a defendant who takes the stand, as People v. Disbrow
held. 220 Selectively removing previously-announced rights
under the state constitution is precisely what Strauss
permitted as a “narrowly drawn exception to a generally
applicable constitutional principle.” 221
But how many instances of “narrowly drawn exception[s]”
could be included in an initiative constitution amendment
before, using the language of Strauss, the “entire protection of
a fundamental constitutional right” is removed? 222 Thus, as in
the example above, what if the authors of Proposition 115 had
217. CAL. CONST. art I, § 24, ¶ 2. 2
218. “Although the people through the initiative power may not change this
court’s interpretation of language in the state Constitution, they may change the
constitutional language itself, and thereby enlarge or reduce the personal rights
that the state Constitution as so amended will thereafter guarantee and protect.”
Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 476 (Kennard, J., concurring).
219. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755 (1955).
220. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101 (1976).
221. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 446.
222. Id.
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specified and expressly removed every previously-expanded
constitutional criminal procedure right under the state
constitution? Arguably, that would cumulatively achieve the
same substantial effect in the limitation of rights, without
technically running afoul of Raven’s federalism prohibition.
But as Strauss suggests, at some point an initiative crosses the
Rubicon from being a permissible narrowly-drawn exception
into being an impermissible removal from a minority group
(criminal defendants) of the entire protection of a right
(constitutional criminal procedural rights). 223 And following
Raven, there is a serious question about whether such a
provision would be a revision rather than an amendment to the
state constitution. These are precisely the constitutional
problems created by applying the Truth-in-Evidence provision
beyond the realm of the search and seizure exclusionary rule
and cumulatively removing so many constitutional criminal
procedural rights.
The most obvious solution to the constitutional problems
created by the Truth-in-Evidence provision is that it should be
declared unconstitutional, just as Proposition 115 was declared
unconstitutional in Raven. But abrogating an initiative
constitutional amendment is a drastic solution. 224 And it is
unnecessary here.
Even given the cumulatively wide
application of the Truth-in-Evidence provision over time, the
constitutional problem has not yet reached the same level as
the one presented by Proposition 115. But a solution is
certainly called for.
Fortunately, there is a less drastic solution, which is to
overturn People v. May and its progeny and limit the Truth-inEvidence provision’s constitutional effect to the exclusionary
rule for illegal searches and seizures. This would harmonize

223. See id.
224. See People v. McKee, 47 Cal. 4th 1172 (2010) (statutes construed to avoid
difficult constitutional issues); Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 23 Cal. 4th
116, 129 (2000) (courts presume lawmakers understand the constitutional limits
on their power and intend that acts respect those limits); People v. Superior Court
(Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 509 (1996) (“ ‘ If a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other
unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional
questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to
the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety,
or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction
is equally reasonable’ ” ).
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the jurisprudence of the Truth-in-Evidence provision with
Raven and Strauss. And indeed they can be read together
harmoniously. Raven and Strauss characterize the scope of the
Truth-in-Evidence provision as a narrowly-drawn limitation
concerning the exclusionary rule for illegal searches and
seizures. Thus, all that need be done is to take those decisions
at face value, apply them to People v. May, and disapprove that
decision as an erroneous extension of the Truth-in-Evidence
beyond its proper scope.
CONCLUSION
California was a progressive leader in developing
constitutional criminal procedural rights under the state
constitution. But, ironically, since this state reached the
farthest, it exhibited the greatest retractions. This Article has
examined the jurisprudential issues raised by the removal of
individual rights from the California Constitution, specifically
those removed by the Truth-in-Evidence provision of the 1982
Proposition 8. The Truth-in-Evidence provision is a broadlyworded constitutional provision, and like any broadly-worded
provision its scope has been debated. As this Article has
described, however, the greater problem here is that the wrong
interpretation of this provision threatens to render it
unconstitutional.
Fairly read, the Truth-in-Evidence provision was intended
for the search and seizure exclusionary rule of Article I, Section
13. But it is equally fair to read the Truth-in-Evidence
provision as not applying to the rights associated with selfincrimination under Article I, Section 15. Indeed, that is how
the California Supreme Court viewed the matter in In re Lance
W and in Raven. And the court has never held that Proposition
8 repealed Article I, Section 15. Despite the continued viability
of Article I, Section 15, the Truth-in-Evidence provision has
been expanded to render the right against self-incrimination
in Article I, Section 15 a nullity.
This state of the law creates a constitutional conflict.
Under Raven, an initiative amendment that would have
lockstepped all state constitutional criminal procedure rights
to the federal constitution was struck down as a revision. But
by the time Raven was decided, the Truth-in-Evidence
provision had grown to be virtually as far-reaching as the
measure Raven invalidated. These two rules conflict. Under
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Raven, the electorate could not by initiative link California
criminal procedural rights to the federal constitution. But
judicial interpretation of Proposition 8 has accomplished
exactly that. Which is correct?
To resolve this constitutional conflict, this Article suggests
disapproving People v. May, the decision that expanded the
scope of the Truth-in-Evidence provision beyond the
exclusionary rule for illegal searches and seizures. So limiting
the Truth-in-Evidence provision has the benefit of both
preserving the rights that the Truth-in-Evidence provision
erroneously removed, and avoiding the need to hold the
provision unconstitutional.
Constitutional interpretation
analysis should err on the side of preserving rights, rather
than assuming the voters intended to abolish them. Removing
an individual’s right from the state constitution is a significant
act, and the repeal of a defendant’s right to be free from
compelled testimony should be done neither by implication nor
by judicial interpretation. 225
The emerging jurisprudence concerning the removal of
rights under the state constitution in Strauss further casts into
doubt the constitutionality of the expansive reading of the
Truth-in-Evidence provision instigated by People v. May.
While Strauss acknowledges that rights previously granted
under the California Constitution can be removed, Strauss also
stresses that such a removal of rights should be narrowly
construed. Indeed, the narrow construction of the Truth-inEvidence provision we argue for here is consistent with
traditional canons of construction. 226 The apparent conflict
between Proposition 8 (which would require a coerced
confession to be admitted because it is relevant), and Article I,
Section 15 (which would require exclusion of a coerced
confession), is governed by the rule that amendments to the
state constitution must be read in harmony with existing
provisions. 227 Here, this requires giving effect to both the right
225. See Ste. Marie v. Riverside Cnty. Reg’l Park & Open-Space Dist., 46 Cal.
4th 282, 296 (2009) (repeals by implication are disfavored); Flores v. Workmen’s
Comp. Appeals Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 171, 176 (1974) (“all presumptions are against a
repeal by implication”).
226. California courts construe provisions added to the state constitution by
voter initiative by applying the same principles governing the construction of a
statute. See Prof’l Engineers in California Gov’t v. Kempton, 40 Cal. 4th 1016,
1037 (2007).
227. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 349
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against self-incrimination and the command to admit relevant
evidence.
If the electorate did not explicitly abolish a constitutional
right, then the courts should presume that the voters meant to
keep it. From that perspective, People v. May had it
backwards: rather than effectuating the intent of the voters, a
judicial decision that removes state constitutional protection
for California citizens when those citizens meant to keep it
frustrates the electorate’s intent, and harms them in their
name.

(1979) (if “the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable
of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute
will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the
Constitution”).

